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Abstract 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry is adopting 
new information communication technology to 
connect its offshore platforms, onshore control 
centers and the suppliers. The management of the oil 
companies is generally aware of the increasing risks 
associated with the transition, but so far, investment 
in incident response (IR) capability has not been 
highly prioritized because of uncertainty related to 
risks and the present reactive mental model for 
security risk management. In this paper, we extend 
previous system dynamics models on operation 
transition and change of vulnerability, investigating 
the role of IR capability in controlling the severity of 
incidents. The model simulation shows that a reactive 
approach to security risk management might trap the 
organization in low IR capability and lead to severe 
incidents. With a long-term view, proactive invest-
ment in IR capability is of financial benefit.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
Connecting to a complex environment is not a choice 
for today’s organizations, but a necessity to survive 
and thrive. Even the businesses where the 
consequences of incidents could be major, such as oil 
and gas production, are moving towards this direction. 
Intense competition requires organizations to be more 
effective, often by the means of information and 
communication technologies (ICT). The cost to 
organizations is that the technology is often more 
complex, takes specialized support and resources, 
and creates a rich environment for breeding 
vulnerabilities and risks [2][4][11].  
According to the 2008 CSI/FBI (Computer 
Security Institute / Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
Computer Crime and Security Survey, 47% of the 
512 responding firms experienced computer security 
incidents, such as virus, insider attack, laptop theft, 
denial of service attacks, unauthorized access of data 
or networks, and bots. The survey also shows that 
incidents occur frequently, with 47% of those who 
experienced incidents, reported to have 1-5 incidents 
over the 12 month, 14% reported 6-10 incidents over 
the 12 months, and 13% reported over 10 incidents 
over the 12 months. The average financial loss per 
respondent was $288,618 [1]. 
Most organizations view security control as an 
overhead and adopt a reactive security management 
approach, i.e., they address security concerns only 
when security incidents are discovered. (Not all 
incidents are discovered. Some stay latent in the 
system.) Indeed, “actions taken to secure an 
organization’s assets and processes are typically 
viewed as disaster-preventing rather than payoff-
producing, which makes it difficult to determine how 
best to justify investing in security, and to what 
level” [5]. For those responsible for security, it is 
often difficult to persuade senior executives and 
board members of the need to implement information 
security in a systemic way [5]. 
The difficulty to “sell” the proactive investment is 
because a paradox exists in information security 
management: If investment is made proactively, the 
frequency of incidents and severity of incidents will 
be reduced, leading to low perception of risk and 
making it difficult to justify the investment in 
information security management. Caralli and Wilson 
[6] point out that the reason why security is viewed 
as overhead is the lack of financial justification. They 
argue that “organizations do not routinely require 
return on investment calculations on security 
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 investments, nor do they attempt to measure or gather 
metrics on the performance of security investments”.   
In this paper, we argue that the reactive approach 
to security risk management could trap enterprises 
into blindness to minor incidents, which could finally 
result in severe incidents. We do so by building a 
system dynamics model that capture the dynamics of 
risk management. We investigate a specific case: an 
offshore oil platform that started transiting its 
traditional operation to Integrated Operations (IO), by 
adopting advanced ICT (information and 
communication technology) to connect to the onshore 
control centers and suppliers. The operation transition 
will last several years with profound ICT-enabled 
changes to many work processes [3]. These changes, 
however, inevitably come with security risks. System 
dynamics is used to model the operation transition as 
well as the managerial responses to the information 
security risk.  
 
Research based on this case using system 
dynamics has been reported earlier in previous 
HICSS conferences and other conferences 
[13][14][15][16][19], where research effort was 
devoted to forming conceptual models [13][14][15], 
and building a formal model that focused on 
understanding how to reduce the vulnerability of the 
operation processes during the operation transition 
[16][19]. The current study takes one step further by 
adding a sub-model to understand the decision-
making process of investing in IR capability. 
Specifically, we compare the proactive security risk 
management approach (i.e., investing before the 
operation transition) with the reactive approach 
(invest in IR capability as and when incidents are 
discovered).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Background information about the case will 
be provided in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
literature review relevant for this case study. We will 
describe the model in section 4, and the analysis of 
the model behavior is presented in section 5. Finally, 
we discuss our findings in section 6. 
 
2. Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry’s 
Transition to Integrated Operations 
 
2.1. Transition to Integrated Operations 
 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry is moving into 
integrated operations (IO), which lead operating 
companies to adopt new ICT solutions. These 
solutions include collaborative videoconferencing, 
remote control of hardware and real-time decision 
support, linking the different actors (onshore, 
offshore, suppliers) together through high-capacity 
computer networks.  
Profound changes will take place for the 
operation transition. In traditional operation, an 
offshore field is essentially a closed system: all the 
skilled resources need to be on-platform, at 
significant cost and some risk to personal safety (see 
Figure 1).  
 Daily operational decisions are made offshore 
with limited onshore support 
 Plans are made and changed fragmentally and at 
fixed times 
 IT solutions are specialized and silo-focused 
 
 
Figure 1 Traditional operation 
 
In the IO paradigm, onshore centres normally closely 
collaborate with offshore personnel through ICT 
technology solutions that share real-time data and 
provide real-time collaboration facilities. 
 Decisions are made together by operators 
on/offshore and consultants at vendors’ onshore 
expert centers 
 Several work processes and decisions are 
automated 
 The vendors deliver their services digitally, i.e., 
over “the net” 
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Figure 2 Integrated Operations 
 
 
This operation transition is expected to increase 
production by 5%-10% and reduce cost of operating 
by 20%-30%. It is estimated that the net present 
value of Integrated Operations on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) is in the order of NOK 150 
bill [3]. (Also see www.olf.no) 
Despite the huge financial benefit of IO, the 
operation transition is full of challenges, with the 
increasing information security risks as a major one.   
From the technological aspect, the prevalence of 
standard PC hardware and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software, and the availability of remote 
control create a new opening for malware to infect 
(and ultimately control) the systems. The increased 
interconnections between process control networks 
and office networks create more points where the 
combined network may fail or be exploited by 
outsiders and other external attacks.  
From the human factors aspect, change is a 
difficult and painful process. When advanced 
technology is in place and new work processes are 
implemented, people need to take time and effort to 
familiarize themselves with the new system. 
Unfamiliarity is one reason which causes human 
error [18]. The new operation is based on the 
effective communication and collaboration via video 
conferencing, which is completely different from the 
traditional operation. It is a challenge for people to 
learn to communicate effectively in a new way, and 
for those who are moved from offshore to onshore, 
new skills will be needed to perform the new tasks. 
From the organizational aspect, new work 
assignments and new work locations could disrupt 
the company’s social structures and their associated 
“know-who” networks. Rebuilding such structures 
takes time. Above all, the company is moving into an 
uncharted territory where no former experience exists. 
What to do, how to do, when to do are questions that 
must be considered with care.  
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry is generally 
aware of the high risks underlying the operation 
transition. They use several oil platforms as pilots for 
the operation transition. One of them is the focus of 
our study.  
 
2.2. The Platform under Study 
 
The platform under study has been in production for 
more than 15 years. It has reached its tail stage with 
decreasing oil production, with traditional operation 
yielding revenues barely enough to cover the 
production cost. Rather than writing off this multi-
million investment by abandoning these oil fields and 
their remaining oil reserves, the company could 
extend the lifetime of the mature platforms with 
deployment of IO. 
Moving into IO, the platform is getting connected 
to a high-speed information network. Production 
decisions are now made together with onshore 
experts. Some of the work is moved to the onshore 
control center; not all skills are needed all the time on 
every platform. The basic manning of this platform 
has been reduced from 41 to 25 persons. The 
increased production and the reduced manning has 
increased profit substantially and extended the life 
span of this platform.  
However, nothing comes without a cost. 
Production processes involved in IO are complex and 
tightly coupled. Integrated operations require a 
variety of systems to be interconnected and large 
amounts of information to be shared. This makes the 
platform vulnerable [9]. Moving from traditional 
offshore operations to IO requires the acquisition of 
more skills. Offshore operators need to know more 
about how to operate and respond to the new 
integrated ICT and supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems. Onshore engineers 
will need to interpret the data they are receiving from 
the various sensors and visualizations, rather than 
what they directly observe on the platform. During 
the operation transition period when skills are not 
fully developed and people are not familiar with the 
complex and tightly coupled work processes, the 
platform is at risk.  
Building IR capability is one important approach 
to controlling risks [15]. In the traditional operation, 
IR capability was less relevant because the platform 
was a closed and secure system with very few 
information security incidents. The major concern 
was about safety accidents in a hazardous environ-
ment. There was no formal incident response team on 
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 the platform; ad hoc teams assembled when emer-
gencies happened. However, moving into IO has 
increased the needs for information security risk 
management. During implementation of IO, there is a 
need to integrate ICT and SCADA systems. The 
knowledge, background and risk perceptions between 
ICT and SCADA professionals vary greatly. The ICT 
professionals have based their risk perceptions on 
ISO 17799, while the SCADA professionals have 
based their risk perceptions on IEC 61508. In 
addition the responsibility of ICT and SCADA 
systems are placed in different organizational silos, 
with little collaboration and few common risk 
perceptions    [17]. 
Interviews with experts in security management 
showed that the platform management teams had not 
worked to proactively identify risks related to 
integration of ICT and SCADA systems or improve 
IR capability when the operation transition started. 
Almost no risk and vulnerability analysis has been 
performed of the integration of ICT and SCADA 
systems, i.e. some of the risks and challenges are not 
known in addition to few common risk perceptions. 
One important motivation of IO is to reduce cost, and 
additional investment in IR capability must be 
presented to management and supported by both the 
SCADA and ICT professionals. This has not always 
been presented in such a manner that IR capability 
has been increased. Although the management is 
aware of increasing risk during the operation 
transition, they still think the probability of incidents 
happening is pretty low. Their mental model is 
investing in IR capability when real signs of 
increasing incidents are observed, i.e., a reactive 
approach. 
In the early 1990’s, when the use of internet 
started to spread in business organizations, Loch, 
Carr and Warkentin conducted a survey of 
information systems managers and found a gap 
between  the use of modern technology  and the 
understanding of the security implications  inherent  
in  its use. They pointed out that “many of responding 
information systems managers have migrated their 
organizations into the highly interconnected 
environment of modern technology but continue to 
view threats from a perspective of a pre-connectivity 
era.” They also identified that the respondents were 
aware of the threats but naively viewed their risk to 
be moderately low [11]. From our group discussions 
with our client and interviews with information 
security management experts, the platform’s 
management has the same mental model as that 
presented by Loch, Carr and Warkentin 15 years ago.  
Perrow has proposed a theory of normal accidents 
based on interaction (degree of complexity) and 
couplings. When interactions between systems are 
complex and the couplings between systems are tight. 
Perrow proposed that an accident could be the 
“normal” outcome  错误！未找到引用源。 This
    perspective   is   relevant   in   IO   since    the 
implementation of IO can lead to increased 
complexity and increased coupling. The two 
dimensions of interest, Interaction and Coupling are 
discussed further in the following. 
Interactions are described as going from linear 
(expected and familiar sequence) to complex 
(unfamiliar sequences not planned or unexpected). 
Complex systems are described as systems 
characterized by proximity, common-mode 
connections, interconnected subsystems, limited 
substitution, feedback loops, multiple and interaction 
controls, indirect information and limited 
understanding.  Due to the increased interaction of 
ICT and SCADA systems in IO, the increased 
exploration of real time data and different 
organizational silos of competence between ICT and 
SCADA – it is clear that the interactions are 
complex. A security (or safety) incident in the 
ICT/SCADA systems may have complex and 
unanticipated consequences. 
Coupling is described as varying from loose to 
tight. A tight coupling has no buffers or slack 
between two items and what happens in one directly 
affects what happens in the other. Loose coupling 
have flexible performance standards and can 
incorporate failures, delays and changes without 
destabilization. Tight Coupling are described as 
systems characterized by: delays in processing not 
possible, invariant sequences, only one method to 
achieve goal, little slack possible (in supplies, 
equipment, personnel), buffers and redundancies are 
designed-in (deliberate) and substitution (of supplies, 
equipment, personnel) limited and designed in. In the 
traditional operation when platform operated 
generally on its own, there were more flexibility, and 
it was easier to adapt to changes without 
destabilization. However, as IO is implemented, 
production planning is made with external experts 
and the ICT system is linked with the SCADA 
system, there is less flexibility and small deviation 
might be enlarged by the interaction of various 
systems and cause destabilization. Thus, we the 
systems may become more tightly coupled. As a 
consequence, the platform may have an increasing 
risk of normal accidents as IO is implemented.  
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 Here, we briefly introduce the prior research efforts 
and how this work is positioned. System dynamics 
have been used for two reasons: First, it serves as a 
communication platform through which to elicit 
information from clients and experts and to provide 
feedback on the model insights to the clients. System 
dynamics group model building workshops were 
conducted for problem identification and model 
conceptualization [14][8]. Second, system dynamics 
is an important modeling tool to help advance our 
scholarly understanding of the dynamics associated 
with the long-term operation transition and 
information security risk management during this 
process.  
Eleven hypotheses about the operation transition 
and the risk change in this process were identified 
during the first group model building workshop with 
clients. How the first group model-building workshop 
was conducted was reported in detail in the paper 
[14]. These hypotheses form the basis for formal 
model development. These eleven hypotheses were 
first presented in [15] and illustrated with conceptual 
models and explanations. Here we summarize them 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - The Eleven Dynamic Hypotheses  
H1 A Knowledge Gap Drives Risk 
H2 A Work Process and Capacity Gap Drives Risk 
H3 Collaborative Workplaces Close Knowledge and 
Work Process Gaps 
H4 Resistance to Change Traps Collaborative 
Workplaces 
H5 CSIRT Capacity Creates New and Mature Security 
Procedures 
H6 Detection Capacity Reduces Damage 
H7 Misperceptions of Risk Create Detection Traps 
H8 Mitigation Capacity Reduces Damage and Promotes 
Learning 
H9 Evaluation Capacity Creates Long Term Learning. 
H10 CSIRT operations may create a Mitigation Trap 
H11 Compliance Dynamics Further Increase Risk 
 
There are two approaches to manage the risk 
[17]. One is to control the threat by reducing the 
likelihood of occurrence, i.e. to reduce the 
vulnerability of the system. The other is to reduce 
potential impact and/or ensure that the organization 
can handle the result of a realized risk, i.e. to increase 
the IR capability. Our prior research has built a 
formal system dynamics model to simulate 
hypotheses 1-4. This modeling effort focused on the 
first approach, looking for ways to reduce the 
vulnerability of the system so that threats are less 
likely to penetrate and become incidents. The model 
and behavior analysis were reported in [16][19]. 
 
Traditional
work
processes
New work
processes
in placedeveloping
new work
processes
Mature
new work
processesintegrating
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processes
Traditional
knowledge
New
knowledge
in placedeveloping
new
knowledge
Mature
knowledgeintegrating
new
knowledge
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burden
Knowledge
gap
Vulnerability
Severity of
incidents
Frequency
of incidents
 
Figure 3 Model focus on vulnerability  
 
Figure 3 presents the simplified structure of the 
formal model based on hypotheses 1-4. The operation 
transition is represented by the two chains of 
changing work processes and knowledge. Knowledge 
takes longer time to mature than work processes. 
Therefore, a knowledge gap will be generated and it 
drives vulnerability (H1). Capacity is an abstract 
concept that was not included in the formal model. 
Thus, H2 could not be identified. The practice of the 
new work processes in collaborative workplaces 
makes new work processes and knowledge mature 
and close the gap between them (H3). Change is 
difficult; new work processes and knowledge 
represent a burden to people. This new initiative 
burden traps the operation transition (H4). (Refer to 
[16][19] for details). The main conclusions of the 
papers are 1) hurrying an implementation can result 
in significant risks; 2) special care should be given to 
knowledge development during the operation 
transition; and 3) knowledge maturation could help to 
reduce the vulnerability.  
The model effort in this paper focuses on 
Hypotheses 5-8, seeking to show how a proactive 
approach to invest in IR capability before the 
operation transition starts can help control risk. With 
simulation, we also investigate why reactive thinking 
does not work well in controlling risks. 
As stated in H5, CSIRT (Computer Security 
Incident Response Team) capacity creates new and 
mature security procedures. In the model, these 
security procedures are all presented in IR capability. 
IR capability reduces damage (H6). When the IR 
capability is low, fewer incidents could be detected, 
leading to misperceptions of risk. This results in 
under investment in IR capability and even lower 
detection (H7). As new work processes and 
knowledge mature, the platform would be more 
resilient, reducing the damage from incidents and 
promote learning (H8).  
3. Prior Research 
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Our formal model is mainly based on hypotheses 5 to 
8 in Table 1, and is presented on Figure 2. 
IR capability measures how many incidents could 
be handled per month. This has two aspects: one is 
how many resources (people*time) are devoted to the 
work, and the other is how productive these resources 
are. A decision to increase incident response 
capability could be to add more resources to the work 
or to improve the productivity of the existing 
resources, e.g. by training. For simplicity, in the 
current version of the model, we do not disaggregate 
these two aspects. IR knowledge and capability 
becomes obsolete over time. New threats, such as 
new attack tools, new vulnerabilities, and new 
viruses, emerge quickly in the area of information 
security. We assume that knowledge and capability 
of IR will become obsolete after one year, and need 
to be updated. 
 
<Frequency of
incidents>
Incident
detected
Perception of
frequency of
incidents
Time to change
perception
Desired Incident
Response Capability
Time to
obsolete
change of
perception
Time to build up
IR capability
Incident
response
capabilityincrease of IR
capability
obsolete of IR
capability
<learning from
incidents>
Effect of learning from
incidents on Incident
response capability
Effect of adequacy of IR
capability on incident detected
Adequacy of IR
capability
 
Figure 4 Incident response capability 
 
The lower part of Figure 4 focuses on the change 
in IR capability. The increase in IR capability is 
mainly from the management’s investment, which is 
based on the desired IR capability. The management 
invests to adjust the IR capability to the desired level. 
Note that this adjustment takes time. If the desired IR 
capability level is lower than the real IR capability, 
no further investment will be made. As IR capability 
obsoletes, it will be reduced.  
The desired IR capability is based on the 
perception of the frequency of incidents. The upper 
part of Figure 4 focuses on the perception of the 
frequency of incidents. Not every incident is detected; 
there is always a fraction that goes unnoticed. How 
large this fraction is depends on the adequacy of the 
IR capability (see equation 1).  
 
Adequacy of incident response capability = 
Incident response capability / Frequency of incidents 
[Equation 1] 
 
If we have a high adequacy of IR capability, then 
a higher fraction of incidents will be detected. If we 
have a low adequacy IR capability, a low fraction of 
incidents will be detected. The incidents detected will 
change the management’s perception of frequency of 
incidents over time, which relates to the perception of 
risk.  
With a low IR capability, fewer incidents will be 
detected, and the perception of frequency of incidents 
will be low, as well as the desired IR capability, As a 
result, investment in IR capability will not be enough, 
which might cause severe incidents in the future. This 
is the capability trap identified in the group model-
building workshop.  
 
5. Model scenarios analysis  
 
This model of IR capability is linked into the model 
of operation transition, making an extended platform 
model. This model went through the standard model 
validation tests, including direct structure test and 
structure oriented behavior test. Moreover, we 
interviewed experts in information security 
management showing model behavior of different 
scenarios. Their recognition of the model behavior 
added confidence to our model.  
With this model, we investigate two different 
scenarios: (1) reactive information security 
management — raise IR capability when seeing 
incidents happen, and (2) proactive information 
security management — raise IR capability before 
major changes – such as operation transition. Only 
one parameter is changed, that is the initial IR 
capability. In the traditional operation, the IR 
capability was quite low because there was little 
information security incidents. The IR capability is to 
prepare for around 1 incident/year, which is 
approximately 0.1 incident/month. In the first 
scenario (the reactive approach), the management 
keeps the IR capability level despite their concern 
about increasing information security risk. In the 
second scenario (the proactive approach), the 
management raises the IR capability to 0.3 
incident/month before the operation transition starts. 
In IO, the IR capability is to prepare for at least three 
 
4. Model of incident response (IR) 
capability 
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 incidents a year. In this scenario, we first try with the 
amount of 0.3/month, which is three times as high as 
the original IR capability. Of course, different 
parameters could be tested using the system 
dynamics model. However, in reality, even being 
proactive, the management will not raise the IR 
capability very high considering the limited resources 
available to the organization.  
 
Table 2 Parameter setting for scenarios 
Scenarios Initial IR 
capability 
Meaning 
Reactive 0.1 
incident/month 
0.1 incident could be 
handled in a month 
Proactive 0.3 
incident/month 
0.3 incident could be 
handled in a month 
 
The simulation behavior is presented in Figure 
5-12. The blue line with number 1 represents the 
reactive scenario and the red line with number 2 
represents the proactive scenario.  
The IR capability affects the severity of 
incidents (H6). It does not influence the operation 
transition. It could be argued that when severe 
incidents happen, the operation transition will be 
delayed or even stopped. However, this linkage is not 
included in the current model. As a result, we can see 
that mature new work processes and mature new 
knowledge behave exactly the same for the two 
scenarios.  
Mature new work processes
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Figure 6 Mature knowledge 
     
As mentioned above, vulnerability of the system 
(called vulnerability index in the model) is affected 
by new work processes, new knowledge and 
knowledge gap. As the two scenarios have exactly 
the same speed of operation transition, these three 
factors do not differ for the two scenarios, this leads 
to identical model behavior of vulnerability Index. 
Vulnerability Index is one important factor influence 
the frequency of incidents. As a result, the frequency 
of incidents remains unchanged for the two scenarios.  
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0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2
21
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Time (Month)
D
m
nl
Vulnerability Index : Reactive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vulnerability Index : Proactice 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7 Vulnerability Index 
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Figure 8 Frequency of incidents 
 
Yet the severity of incidents reduced from 
peaking at 1.7M/incident in the reactive scenario to 
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 peaking at 1.2M/incident in the proactive scenario, 
leading around 30% reduction. Suggested by the 
information security experts in this project, incident 
cost from 100K-2M NOK is ranked level 3 (level 5 
for most serious incident), labeled as “dangerous”, 
and cost from 2M-20M NOK is ranked level 4, 
labeled as “critical”. We can see that in the reactive 
scenario, the incident severity is approaching critical 
level. For the proactive scenario, the severity of 
incidents stays in the middle of dangerous level.    
Severity of incidents
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Figure 9 Severity of incidents 
 
Expected incident cost is the product of 
frequency of incidents and severity of incidents. 
Frequency of incidents is tightly related to the 
vulnerability of the system, which is the same for the 
two scenarios. The severity of incidents is lower in 
proactive scenario. As a result, the expected incident 
cost peaks about 30% lower in the proactive scenario 
compared to the reactive scenario.   
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        In the reactive scenario, the IR capability starts 
from 0.1 incident/month. As the operation transition 
starts, the frequency of incidents increases sharply in 
the first year as new work processes and knowledge 
are implemented and a knowledge gap generated. 
However, the IR capability increases slowly (see 
Figure 11), much more slowly than the increase of 
frequency of incidents (see Figure 8).   
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Figure 11 Incident response capability 
 
There are two reasons that account for this slow 
growth of IR capability. First, there are delays in the 
system. It takes time for the management to perceive 
the increase of incidents. In our model, there is a 
three-month delay before the perception of frequency 
of incidents is changed. This is because the incident 
data are reported and reviewed quarterly. There is 
another time delay to build IR capability. The IR 
capability will not be immediately ready when the 
investment decision is made. If the decision is to add 
people to IR work, then it will take time to announce 
an opening, find the proper person through interviews, 
and train the people to the specific work. If the 
decision is to make the existing people more 
productive, then it will take time to find a proper 
training program and let people learn.  
However, what contributes more in the slow 
development of IR capability is that with low IR 
capability, a large fraction of incidents is not detected, 
as stated in Hypothesis 7. Only the detected incidents 
can be reported. Therefore, the management’s 
perception of frequency of incidents is much lower 
than it actually is, and so is the desired IR capability. 
This leads to underinvestment in IR capability, which 
results in high severity of incidents later. Figure 12 
reports in one chart the frequency of incidents (blue 
line with F), incident detected (red line with I), 
desired incident response capability (green line with 
D) and incident response capability (purple line with 
C). It clearly shows how incidents detected grow 
slowly along with the desired IR capability, and the 
real IR capability follows with another delay. After 
several years of slow development, the incidents 
detected gradually approaches the frequency of 
incidents.  
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Figure 12 Related variables of the development of IR 
capability 
 
As we discussed above, severe incidents on an 
oil platform might have a huge impact, ultimately 
threatening human life and the environment. The 
management of companies in the oil and gas industry 
is keen to avoid severe incidents. However, as we see 
from the simulation result, reactive thinking could 
lead to an IR capability trap, which could lead to 
critical incidents during the operation transition. 
With a proactive thinking, the IR capability starts 
higher and a larger portion of the incidents could be 
detected. The desired IR capability will also be 
higher, which leads to less underinvestment. There-
fore, the severity of incidents is largely reduced in the 
proactive scenario (see Figure 9). 
Being proactive seems to be a good policy. 
However, having more IR capability means more 
money to be invested in IR. The management team is 
concerned with the financial impact of a policy. We 
evaluate the overall financial impact of these two 
scenarios.  
 
Overall financial impact = Expected incident 
cost + Cost for Incident response capability. 
[Equation 2] 
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Overall financial impact : Reactive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall financial impact : Proactive 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
Figure 13 Overall financial impact 
 
      In the long run, being proactive generates a much 
lower total cost than being reactive. (Initially there is 
a small perturbation). Of course, this result is highly 
sensitive to the cost of IR capability and the amount 
of incident cost IR capability could reduce. Yet in a 
high–risk environment such as an oil platform on the 
brink  of a transition to Integrated Operation when 
increasing risks is obvious, it is most likely that being 
proactive would be the optimal choice for the 
organization.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
      This paper uses the system dynamics model to 
demonstrate how proactive thinking and reactive 
thinking in information security risk management 
could generate a different risk picture in the long run. 
In the reactive scenario, when the IR capability is low 
at the beginning of the operation transition, fewer 
incidents are detected, leading to misperceptions of 
risk. This causes underinvestment in IR capability, 
and the IR capability might become even more 
inadequate in the face of increasing information 
security risk as the operation transition moves on. 
This IR capability trap could lead to undetected 
incidents hidden in the system, which makes the 
system more vulnerable. Furthermore, when incidents 
happen, the inadequate IR capability might not 
handle the incident efficiently, thus leading to severe 
incidents. Being proactive, raising the IR capability 
before the operation transition starts, would lead to 
better incident detection and a better risk perception, 
leading to more realistic investment decisions and 
better management of the information security risks 
in the long run. And the model proves that proactive 
method is cost-beneficial in the long run. 
    
6.1. Contribution to research 
 
This paper builds upon and extends the prior 
research by building a formal model of IR capability 
building during the operation transition. The prior 
research on this case focuses on reducing 
vulnerability to reduce the frequency of incidents. 
The link that IR capability could reduce the severity 
of incidents has not been previously considered. 
Adding a feedback loop of IR capability building and 
its influence on severity of incidents completes the 
information security risk management picture. 
During the operation transition, policies related to the 
transition, such as changing the transition speed and 
changing the resource allocation, will certainly affect 
information security. At the same time, policies on IR 
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 capability will also have an impact on information 
security.   
A system dynamics model is used to compare 
cost-effectiveness of proactive versus reactive 
approach. Many scholars have proposed a proactive 
approach for information security, such as [7][20]. 
Yet they do not have quantitative analysis on cost-
effectiveness of proactive approach. Allen has 
suggested the following changes in information 
security management [5].  
 
Table 3 Shifts in Perspective 
From: To: 
Security is a technical 
problem. 
Security is a enterprise-
wide problem 
Security has a 
technical owner. 
Security is owned by the 
enterprise. 
There is an intermittent 
focus on security. 
Security is integrated. 
Security is an expense. Security is an investment. 
The goal is security. The goal is business 
continuity and ultimately 
resiliency. 
 
      If the perspective of security has changed from an 
expense to an investment, it would become easier to 
justify the proactive investment in IR capability. 
However, the shifts in perspective take a long time. 
Meanwhile, we can use system dynamics models to 
justify the proactive investment and help people to 
realize that security is an investment, or at least cost 
beneficial.  
 
6.2. Contribution to practice 
 
     In this highly competitive world, companies try to 
cut any cost that might be unnecessary. Therefore, it 
is seldom that management is proactive in 
information security management. The platform 
under study is one case among many. A recent study 
of Johnsen shows that risk awareness on offshore oil 
installations is poor [10]. “Only 5 of the 46 instal-
lations had performed a risk and vulnerability anal-
ysis, to identify the most dominating risks related to 
integration between SCADA and ICT systems.” This 
low awareness leads to poor incident reporting, mis-
perception of risk and low IR capability, which is a 
dangerous situation. Through model simulation, we 
can see that without raising initial IR capability, the 
severity of incidents sharply increases, approaching 
critical level (the second most severe level). 
Considering that the severity of incidents in the 
model is an average figure, this means that there is 
potential of highly critical incidents happening. If 
anything on such a scale should happen, it will have 
huge impact on the reputation of the oil company and 
hinder the operation transition processes.  
     What the model shows is applicable not only to oil 
and gas companies during the operation transition, 
but also to other high-risk organizations under normal 
operation. More and more people are connected to 
the Internet and even without an operation transition; 
the companies are facing changing environments and 
increasing threat. If the company’s data shows a nice 
picture of few incidents and low risk, it could be that 
the company has managed its information security 
risk very well and that it is resilient to threats. 
However, it could also be that people are not aware 
of the incidents happening, or they are not reporting 
the incidents. More detailed analysis of the situation 
is needed before jumping to a quick conclusion; an 
audit program for information security would be 
worthwhile to investigate the real picture of 
information security risks.  
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